Special Issue R861 of neuroscientific data. We will outline three significant domains of engagement between law and neuroscience, and will enumerate several inferential challenges that confound the scientific validity of neuroscientific evidence. Finally, we offer recommendations for enhancing the ability of neuroscience to validly render assistance to the courts.
In 1991, using a combination of powerful magnets and "sewer pipe, wire, epoxy, and finger tapping," a small number of research groups converged on the idea of capitalizing on the magnetic resonance properties of gray matter to image the active, thinking human brain -an approach now known as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) [1] . Cognitive neuroscience has since developed at a pace that could scarcely be imagined given these humble origins, and the ensuing two decades have witnessed an explosion of ingenious techniques and sophisticated tools. Each new advance in brain imaging is greeted with a chorus of speculation about its potential application to other arenas of human endeavor.
Discussions about the 'promise of neuroscience' are often tinged with a particular mixture of anxious hope and desperate fear. Nowhere is this more evident than in the courts. In both popular media and scholarly publications, there has been much excitement about the impact that cognitive neuroscience might have on legal cases. This discussion is rife with speculation, centered on the notion that neuroscience holds the promise of detecting liars, objectively determining criminal responsibility, quantifying suffering and predicting violence. We argue that the discourse about 'neurolaw' often sheds more heat than light, as these promises elide a fundamental and perilous chasm between the aims and methods of scientific research and how courts might use that research. The relationship between neuroscience and law is fraught with fundamental differences, the implications of which we are only beginning to understand (Figure 1) .
Here, we attempt to reconcile the promises made for neuroscience and law with the inferential limits sidewalk and into a bus shelter, fatally wounding another person. How blameworthy is John for the injury? How much punishment does he deserve? Now consider an alternative scenario: Steve is out for a drive in his new car, when he spies his ex-wife's new boyfriend waiting for a bus. He has threatened to kill this man before, and proceeds to make good on that threat. Gripping the wheel, he lurches the car directly into the bus shelter killing the boyfriend. Is Steve more blameworthy than John for the man's death? Does he deserve more punishment? The modal answer to each question is, far and away, 'yes'. This exercise illustrates an age-old legal principle, encapsulated in the phrase "actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea", meaning, 'an act is not guilty unless the mind is guilty'. While this principle is, of course, considerably more complicated and nuanced in practice, its basic logic applies across most legal settings. Criminal law codes enumerate a vast multitude of proscribed behaviors, but merely committing one of these prohibited acts (actus rea) is usually not enough alone to merit punishment. In the law, blameworthiness is judged also by the mental state that accompanied the bad act. Blame is thus accorded by a combination of the act and the intention, with criminal sanctions measured by the severity of the deed and the guilty mind that accompanied it (mens rea, meaning, literally, "guilty mind").
In the two scenarios above, we are tasked with comparing blameworthiness and deserved punishment for an identical harm, but which followed in one case from a 'pure' accident, and in the other from an explicit intention to kill. If mental state inferences were as straightforward as this, the job of legal decision-makers would be considerably easier. The law recognizes that 'intent is not as cut and dry as accident vs. non-accident, and distinguishes between several distinct mental states when evaluating blameworthiness. For example, the American Law Institute's model penal code defines four hierarchical levels of culpability (purposeful, knowing, reckless, negligent) in relation to three Stunning technical advances in the ability to image the human brain have provoked excited speculation about the application of neuroscience to other fields. The 'promise' of neuroscience for law has been touted with particular enthusiasm. Here, we contend that this promise elides fundamental conceptual issues that limit the usefulness of neuroscience for law. Recommendations for overcoming these challenges are offered.
Promises, promises for neuroscience and law
specific objective criteria (conduct elements, result elements, attendant circumstances). The blameworthiness of a defendant, and hence his or her deserved punishment, varies according to these four levels of intent, though the extent to which lay people -and thus, jurors -can meaningfully distinguish between these legally distinct mental states has been questioned [7] . Blameworthiness is also affected by the presence of mitigating circumstances (such as duress) that bear directly on a defendant's mental state, and their capacity to form a specific level of intent.
So far, enthusiasm for neuroscience as it pertains to mental states has focused on providing support for insanity defenses at the guilt phase of trials, or as mitigating evidence during the penalty phase in capital cases. While rarely successful at the guilt stage, brain imaging evidence has been credited with reducing sentences at the penalty phase [8] . More generally, the introduction of brain imaging evidence has, to date, run the gamut of legal contexts: "everything from competence to waive Miranda rights, subjective experience of pain in tort cases, custody determinations, mens rea defenses for fraud, kidnapping, burglary, and even murder" according to Brown and Murphy's exhaustive review [9] .
Mental state judgments are not restricted to questions of intent and blameworthiness. Whether conscious and deliberate or hidden and automatic, bias represents a serious threat to the administration of justice. The ability to objectively measure bias, especially in potential jurors, is something of a holy grail for jury and trial consultants. Race bias, in particular, has been well studied in social psychology, and there have been several reports of neural signatures for such biases [10] . Indeed, one recent study observed that brain activity during a race bias task was positively correlated with the amount of money the subjects awarded victims in a hypothetical employment discrimination case [11] . The "promise" of neuroscience in this area is the provision of an objective metric for determining bias in legal decision-makers and legal actors.
The mental state of 'suffering' is often at issue in civil law. The magnitude of compensatory damages awarded to a plaintiff hinges, in part, on the amount of physical and emotional harm caused by a defendant. While some physical harms do not require extensive empirical verification (e.g. loss of limbs, extensive burns), other forms of physical injury (e.g. chronic pain) are more challenging to quantify. Furthermore, emotional harm (i.e. mental suffering and emotional distress) is often treated as a secondary consideration because of the difficulty in obtaining objective, quantitative measures of these mental states. Courts are frequently caught between the Scylla of real-butunverifiable pain and the Charybdis of malingering. Hence, many legal scholars have greeted the discovery of intensity-dependent, regionally specific brain-imaging correlates of pain experience with great interest. As one example, Adam Kolber has suggested that "neuroimaging may, in the not-too-distant future, supplement our evaluations of pain claims by supporting genuine claims or, possibly, impugning malingered ones and provide increasingly objective methods of assessing the severity of a person's pain and comparing that to the pain of other people" [12] .
Self-control
The second domain of engagement for law and neuroscience relates to self-control. The issue of 'self-control' or 'volitional control pervades the American criminal and quasicriminal (i.e., civil commitment and sex-offender registration regimes) justice systems. An individual's ability to control his or her behavior is central to many legal decisions, often as a component of assessing the culpability of past acts. Criminal liability is premised on the notion that people are in control of their actions. Thus, a choice to commit harm, or to engage in conduct that leads to harm, is considered just that, a choice. Liability implies that when an agent selects an action that results in harm, there were other actions available and -like any other person in the same circumstance -he or she had the ability to choose otherwise, but did not. Highlighting the idea that the capacity for self-control is a cornerstone of criminal liability, philosopher of law Michael Moore wrote: "We are responsible for wrongs we freely choose to do, and not responsible for wrongs we lacked the freedom (capacity and opportunity) to avoid doing" [13] .
The neuroscience of self-control capacity has affected legal practice and policy in two ways. First, brain imaging and neurogenetic evidence has been introduced during the sentencing phase of capital cases as mitigating evidence to support a claim of volitional impairment. For example, fMRI evidence was used to support the claim that Brian Dugan, convicted of raping and murdering a 10-year-old girl, was unable to control his behavior. Similarly, an Italian court reduced the sentence of convicted murderer Abdelmalek Bayout after hearing evidence that the defendant's genome harbors a variant linked to poor impulse control. These cases are particularly notable in light of recent empirical work showing that presenting fMRI and genetic evidence to U.S. state judges during the penalty phase of a hypothetical murder trial led to lower sentences for the defendant [14] . Such findings are consistent with the idea that biological evidence of reduced self-control capacity can mitigate culpability for criminal defendants. A second context in which the neuroscience of selfcontrol has become relevant to the law is in the area of juvenile justice policy [15] . In the last ten years, three landmark Supreme Court decisions eliminated the death sentence for minors (Roper v. Simmons) [16] , found that sentences of life without parole for minors convicted of non-homicide offenses were unconstitutional (Graham v. Florida) [17] , and abolished mandatory life without parole sentences for all minors, irrespective of their crime (Miller v. Alabama) [18] . In these cases, developmental neuroscience data were used to argue that adolescent criminal defendants are less capable of self-control by virtue of their relatively immature brains, and therefore less culpable.
Prediction
The criminal justice system is charged not only with sanctioning past offenses, but also with preventing future ones. Though the prospective function of the courts is less immediately obvious, it is no less essential than its retrospective role. This point was made plainly by the U.S. Supreme Court's statement in Simmons v. South Carolina that "a defendant's future dangerousness bears on all sentencing determinations made in our criminal justice system" [19] . The predictive duties of the court are most apparent in probation, parole, pretrial detention, sentencing and civil commitment hearings. Historically, clinical evaluation was considered to be the gold standard for determining the 'future dangerousness' of an offender. However, such assessments have been strongly criticized as unstructured and subjective, and empirical data do not support either their reliability or predictive validity [20] .
In response to the problems associated with clinical prediction, scholars in this area have developed a more rigorously quantitative approach. These 'actuarial' techniques use formulas that consider demographic and behavioral variables to place individuals into ranked risk categories. While significantly more reliable than clinical evaluation, actuarial prediction has faced opposition from mental health professionals and skepticism in the courts [20] . Actuarial prediction has also been criticized by scholars who concede that this approach is much better than clinical assessment, yet who argue that the absence of biological information about violence in actuarial formulae represents a fundamental failing. This perspective is grounded in two somewhat dubious propositions. First, that neuroscience "has established with sufficient certainty the particular areas of the brain that affect action relevant to aggression and impulse control". And second, that without cognitive neuroscience data, "no matter how accurate the instrument, it will be impossible to predict a particular individual's behavior" [21] .
It is true that neuroscience has begun to uncover some of the neurobiological underpinnings of antisocial behavior. A modest number of brain imaging studies have reported structural and functional correlates of antisocial behavior: genetic associations to impulsive-aggression -most notably involving an upstream tandem repeat polymorphism in the monoamine oxidase A geneand structural, functional and connectivity correlates of violence risk-linked variants, which account for a small amount of variability in the structure and function of brain circuits linked to threat response and inhibitory control [22] . The biological complexity of violenceand the correspondingly small effect sizes attached to individual causal factors -necessarily renders such insights preliminary [22] [23] [24] . However, some legal scholars have nevertheless contended that "cognitive neuroscience provides an objective basis upon which to predict future dangerousness and provide for the involuntary commitment of violent offenders both during and after their sentence" [21] . This argument is based on the notion that neuroscientific evidence could meet the "threshold standard for involuntary commitment because it can determine -with a reasonable degree of accuracywhether a criminal defendant remains a threat to himself." The argument that neuroscientific data could form a constitutionally valid basis for involuntary commitment is profoundly misguided. Indeed, it illustrates the perilous gap between how neuroscientists think about neuroscientific data and how some in the law might like to use these data. (Figure 2 ). Consider a case in which a neuroscientist is asked to testify about a defendant's ability to exercise self-control at the time of his alleged offense. This question will likely reference one or more specific legal doctrines germane to the issue. In the domain of self-control, some of the relevant doctrines require a determination of the defendant's capacity to: conform behavior to the requirements of the law, know or appreciate whether conduct is wrong, control complex bodily functioning, premeditate, maintain composure when provoked or in other states of extreme mental or emotional stress and contemplate the consequences of his or her actions. These are normative concepts that have no inherent relationship to operationalizable cognitive processes. Thus, any attempt to measure them scientifically will be, at best, a good-faith guess, and at worst a very costly form of interdisciplinary charades. As long as legal concepts that invoke aspects of mental function remain cognitively underspecified to a degree that prevents appropriate operationalization by scientists, the evidentiary value of neuroscientific data will be limited.
The G2i problem
The group-to-individual (G2i) problem has its roots in a core difference between the aim and methods of science, and the goals of the legal system. Science is focused on understanding universal phenomena. Groups of individuals are studied with the aim of making inferences that can be generalized to the population from which these individuals are drawn. By contrast, the goal of a trial court is to make determinations about individuals. Courts often attempt to use science's general knowledge of a phenomenon to make individuallevel inferences [25, 26] . As Faigman has put it, "While science attempts to discover the universals hiding among the particulars, trial courts attempt to discover the particulars hiding among the universals" [25] . However, science's generalized, populationlevel knowledge of a phenomenon does not necessarily provide an appropriate empirical foundation for making inferences about the instantiation of that phenomenon in any given individual.
Consider an fMRI experiment in which 30 subjects were instructed to tell the truth about a set of facts in one condition, and to lie about that set of facts in another. The Figure 3 . The G2i problem. Thirty subjects are asked to either lie or tell the truth about an objective fact during fMRI. Contrasting brain activity during the 'lying' versus 'truth-telling' conditions shows that, across all subjects, lying is associated with enhanced activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; starred region) compared to truth-telling. However, examination of individual DLPFC values in each condition reveals substantial inter-subject variability. Crucially, while lying is linked to increased DLPFC activity on the mean, some participants show no difference between lying and truth-telling (subject 18; green rectangle) or higher DLPFC function during truth-telling (subject 20; red rectangle). Relying on DLPFC activity to determine whether a defendant is lying or telling the truth would lead to a false negative in subject 18 and a false positive in subject 20.
experimenters, as is typical, use a mixed-effects model to contrast fMRI blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) response amplitude between the two conditions, first within each subject and then between all subjects, treating subject as a random factor. After appropriate correction for multiple comparisons, their statistical parametric map reveals several brain regions (including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; DLPFC) that show higher amplitude responses to lying as compared to truth-telling. Of course, if the experimenters were to plot peak DLPFC BOLD responses across all subjects, they would find that lying-related DLPFC recruitment differs dramatically across the sample. Some participants show very strong DLPFC activity during lying, others do not show any difference, and a few subjects have the opposite pattern entirelyincreased DLPFC BOLD responses to truth-telling compared to lying. However, despite pronounced variation between individuals, the size of the effect is large enough, relative to the variance between subjects, to reject the null hypothesis. Because each subject is treated as though they were drawn at random from the population of all potential subjects, the statistical analysis permits formal inference about the stereotypical or 'universal' effect of the experimental manipulation. So far, this experiment is pretty standard cognitive neuroscience. What then, limits its applicability to the courts?
In truth, there are several problems with fMRI lie detection, including issues related to construct and content validity, ecological validity, and reverse inference, and these have been the subject of excellent analyses elsewhere [27] . For the purpose of this discussion, the fMRI lie-detection experiment nicely illustrates the G2i problem. If group-level brain imaging studies indicate that a particular brain region or brain network is activated during an experimental task that purports to access some legallyrelevant dimension of cognition, it is presumed that measuring an individual's fMRI signal in that region or network provides an objective marker of that cognitive capacity in that individual. However, translating group-level scientific findings into information that is useful for an individual legal actor is far from straightforward, and we have argued previously that 'individualizing' neuroscience data in the courts via G2i inference is fundamentally unsound [26] .
Based on the hypothetical study described above, courts might be tempted to treat DLPFC as an individual-level biomarker for lying. However, even a cursory glance at the individual DLPFC BOLD signal values from this experiment should fatally undermine this presumption (Figure 3) . The experimenters' analysis showing that DLPFC is more active on the mean during lying obscures the fact that some individuals showed no increase in DLPFC activation during lying and still others showed increased DLPFC activity during truth-telling. If the defendant fell into either of the latter two categories, individual measurement of DLPFC during fMRI lie-detection would be highly misleading. In the first case, the defendant's lie would not be detected. In the second case, the court might infer that the defendant was lying when in fact they were not. The G2i problem is of course not limited to brain-based lie-detection. It is a general problem that obtains whenever group-level data are used to support individual-level inferences.
External and incremental validity
Legal policy must account for the fact that neuroscience evidence may not generalize across different settings. Concern here arises out of potential interpretational biases inherent to, for example, brain imaging. While the law may be sensitive to issues of external validity with behavioral measures, the sense that measuring the brain reveals something 'hardwired' and unchangeable may blind legal decision-makers to this issue. It would be an error to presume that a neuroscientific measure of some mental process is a reliable proxy for measuring the operation of that process in the 'real world'. Though the use of neuroscience in the courts often rests on the presumption that behavior measured in the laboratory tracks behavior in the real world, we still know relatively little about the conditions under which this assumption is valid.
It is often assumed that neuroscientific measures of cognition provide higher fidelity insight into our mental states and intrinsic capacities, relative to behavioral and self-report measures. This assumption drives much of the enthusiasm around 'neuroprediction' [21] .However, at least in the domain of prediction, evidence of incremental validity for neuroscientific data is sparse. Given the expense and potentially prejudicial nature of neuroscientific evidence [9] , rigorous evaluation of the incremental validity of neuroscientific data over and above mere behavior is needed. To date, we know of only one such study that assessed the increased predictive power of fMRI for a legally-relevant behavior [28] . Using a prospective design in a sample of incarcerated offenders, the authors found that an fMRI BOLD signal measure did appear to provide better predictive power for recidivism than behavior alone. However, the effect was only found for non-violent offenders; the predictive power of fMRI was not compared to actuarial measures; and the relative
Process model for neuroscientific evidence
Articulate what, specifically, law wants
Are 'legally meaningful' inferences valid?
Better than behavior?
Clarify legal standards Is this operationalizable? Figure 4 . A process model for evaluating neuroscientific evidence. The first two steps involve clarifying which legal standards or concepts incorporate determinations about mind and brain. They specifically articulate how neuroscience could be useful for making these determinations. In addition, these steps would demarcate standards that appear to reference mind and brain, but for which there is legal consensus that neuroscientific evidence is neither desired nor required for adjudication. The third step describes an iterative 'conversation' between neuroscience and law to determine how to best to operationalize legal standards that reference mental function. In the final steps, neuroscience assesses the scientific validity and incremental value of 'legally meaningful' neuroscientific evidence.
improvement in predictive accuracy due to the brain-imaging variable was modest. Nevertheless, this study exemplifies a useful approach to testing the incremental validity of neuroscientific evidence.
Can bad science make for good evidence? Some legal scholars have argued that the challenges we outline above are overblown, or in any case irrelevant to the administration of law. As this argument goes, even given these confounds neuroscientific evidence is likely to be better -or at least, no worse -than the status quo. Though neuroscience evidence is not "perfect", a 'little bit' of reliability and validity is be better than nothing, and thus there might be circumstances in which 'bad science' could be 'good evidence'. For example, Schauer claims that "because law's goals and norms differ from those of science, there is no more reason to impose the standards of science on law than to impose the standards of law on science" [29] . We categorically reject this argument. Bad science cannot make for good law any more than good tarot card reading could make for good law. When scientists talk about bad science, we mean that a study, approach, or technique is inferentially compromised. When an experimental effect has an associated p-value of 0.2, this does not mean that it's 80% trustworthy. It isn't 'more trustworthy' than an effect with a p-value of 0.5, it is simply untrustworthy. Thus, when scientists label brain-based liedetection as 'bad science' because of fatal issues with reliability and validity, they mean that they don't trust the ability of that method to measure the phenomenon of interest. In that instance, the scientists are not saying that they don't trust it as much as a better approach to lie-detection but more than tarotcard reading. They are declaring the method to be epistemologically bankrupt.
A response to this argument is that the question of when science is good enough for the courts is ultimately a normative and institutional one, and therefore the exclusive purview of law rather than science [29] . While true in a narrow sense, this position poses a serious threat to the legitimacy of scientific evidence. If the law permits scientific evidence to be introduced in the courts but refuses to be constrained by the limitations of scientific inference, it is saying that it is not really interested in science at all. This approach threatens to turn science into an empirical fig-leaf: something used to cover the law's anxieties about the uncertainty inherent in evaluating human minds -and its insecurities about relying on its own normative preferences and precedents -but fundamentally insubstantial. In fact, we argue that bad science is actually worse than no science, because it gives the false appearance of rigor and certainty. The lingua franca and G2i problems represent profound threshold challenges to the valid use of neuroscience in the courts. Rather than make do with inferentially compromised science, we argue for an empirically driven policy framework that can help guide decisions about whether, how, and when cognitive and neuroscientific data can be used to make legal judgments about individual defendants.
Where do we go from here?
We call for the development of a neuro-legal lingua franca to facilitate objective classification of legal standards according to scientifically meaningful criteria. Ultimately, only legal policymakers can make the value judgments on which policy is based. However, legal rules that involve the human mind and mental function should include quantifiable and testable concepts of mind and brain. Development of this lingua franca should involve determining which experimental paradigms provide the best fit for specific legal standards. Furthermore, it should explicitly identify legal standards for which the law indicates that it neither desires nor requires scientific evidence to adjudicate. This common conceptual language would allow scientists understand a priori that a given experimental manipulation or measurement does, does not, or cannot, access a specific legal concept, and will facilitate the translation (i.e. operationalization) of legal concepts with greater fidelity. If the law intends to permit the use of cognitive and neuroscientific evidence to make inferences about legally germane aspects of mind and brain, legal policymakers must work with scientists to ensure that legally meaningful judgments arising from scientific data are, in fact, scientifically valid.
Second, we need a strong empirical foundation for tackling the G2i problem. This would require extensive knowledge of the distribution of legally relevant cognitive processes in large, representative samples. While the law sorts people into discrete cognitive taxa (e.g. competent vs. not-competent; responsible vs. not-responsible) inter-individual differences in mental functioning are in fact more dimensional than categorical. Despite our increasing general understanding of legally relevant mental phenomena, meaningful individual-level inferences are largely precluded by the absence of large, demographically representative datasets that could elucidate the population distribution of the many cognitive capacities that courts might consider pertinent to legal judgments. Individual measurements of cognition and behavior, neuroscientific or otherwise, are only meaningful in reference to such distributions. Without these large-scale population norms, even experimental tasks with high reliability and validity would be unsuitable for individual-level inference of the kind that is required in courtroom settings. Of course, even assuming that science could quantify where in the population distribution a given individual falls with respect to a specific legallyrelevant mental function, determining when a person crosses the threshold into abnormality is entirely a normative question and outside the purview of science.
We believe that neuroscience can and should be used to enhance the fairness and efficiency of the legal system. However, the promise of neuroscience with respect to the law can only ever be fulfilled if we clearly identify and resolve the significant inferential issues that lie at the intersection of these two disciplines. This will require a coordinated, proactive, interdisciplinary effort that engages scientists, clinicians, jurists, legal scholars and lawmakers to devise a principled approach to integrating neuroscientific evidence into legal practice (Figure 4) .
Crucially, this effort should identify specific legal concepts and standards that are either incommensurable with neuroscience, or for which the law indicates that neuroscientific evidence is unnecessary or unwanted. The law is not compelled to use neuroscientific evidence to render its decisions; judgments made on the basis of moral intuition, normative preference, or institutional precedent do not require the consult of neuroscientist. However, the use of neuroscientific evidence to make legal determinations about minds and brains should be constrained by the limits of scientific inference. Good law cannot follow from bad, or badly used, science.
Behavioral economics Colin F. Camerer
Behavioral economics uses evidence from psychology and other social sciences to create a precise and fruitful alternative to traditional economic theories, which are based on optimization. Behavioral economics may interest some biologists, as it shifts the basis for theories of economic choice away from logical calculation and maximization and toward biologically plausible mechanisms.
Before this behavioral shift, economic theories assumed that agents have subjective numerical utilities for bundles of goods and services. Optimizing agents choose the utility-maximizing bundle given constraints determined by prices, available information and income. This 'constrained optimization' approach was never intended to be a realistic model of human cognition. Instead, the guess was that predictions based on the optimization model -such as how people respond to a change in the tax on alcohol -would be roughly accurate, perhaps after some period of adjustment to the change.
The behavioral-economics alternative adds limits to computational ability, willpower and selfishness to the historical optimization approach. Knowledge of these limits comes from psychology and, more recently, neuroscience. In this general behavioral view, prices, income and information certainly affect behavior. However, the way in which information is processed to make choices can be described by psychological principles that often are not statistically optimal. Other psychological factors, such as how choices are described (or, equivalently, framed) and attended to, can affect economic behavior as well.
Behavioral economics is especially useful when decisions are complex and optimality is difficult to achieve. These decisions include some of the most important choices people make,
